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Abstract 
 
While complexity science is gaining interest among educational theorists, its constructs do not 
speak to educational responsibility or related core issues in education of power and ethics. Yet 
certain themes of complexity, as taken up in educational theory, can help unsettle the more 
controlling and problematic discourses of educational responsibility such as the potential to limit 
learning and subjectivity or to prescribe social justice. The purpose of this article is to critically 
examine complexity science against notions of responsibility in terms of implications for 
education. First, themes of complexity science prominent in contemporary educational writing 
are explained. Then dilemmas of responsibility in complexity are explored, such as what forms 
and meanings responsibility can have in a ‘complexified’ perspective of education, how care for 
others is mobilised, and how desire can be understood. Analyses of ethical action grounded in 
complexity science are then examined, as well as theories of the ethical subject and participatory 
responsibility that are congruent with certain tenets of a complexity ontology. Finally, the 
possibility of an educational vision of responsibility animated by complexity theories is 
considered, drawing from related writings of Bai, Biesta, Derrida, Levinas and Varela.
 Responsibility, Complexity Science and Education: Dilemmas and Uncertain Responses 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Complexity science is growing in popularity among educational researchers. Actually to refer to 
‘complexity science’ or complexity theory as though it is a singular, monolithic body of 
knowledge is a gross error of misrepresentation: the complexity field by now embraces widely 
diverse theories such as general systems, cybernetics, chaos, deep ecological, enactivist and 
autopoetic theories. Nevertheless the term ‘complexity science’ will be used in this article, albeit 
cautiously, because it appears increasingly in educational writings. While its uptake is most 
evident in curriculum studies and K-12 pedagogical writing, it is beginning to appear in adult 
education and higher education (Cutright, 2001; Haggis, 2007; Karpiak, 2000) and has become 
popular in workplace education, particularly organisational development and training 
(Kauffman, 1995; Stacey, 2005).  
 
A central problem in all of these uptakes, however, remains the question of responsibility – a 
question that arguably emerges at some point in any educational theorising. In fact educational 
writers such as Davis and Sumara (2006) as well as scientists such as Varela (1999) have 
attached notions of the good to their theorising of complexity in ways that raise questions about 
responsibility and ethics. However, derived as it was from biological and mathematical sciences, 
complexity science as a framework does not inherently offer constructs that speak to questions of 
educational responsibility. One may, as some have done, manipulate certain precepts of 
complexity science to adduce generalisations about responsibility from complexity’s 
explanations about how elements in a system interact. But such analyses cannot legitimately 
answer important educational questions of how one should act or who is responsible to whom, 
nor can they address central issues of educational responsibility: power, culture, ethics, social 
responsibility and democracy. One might argue, therefore, that to frame approaches to 
educational pedagogy, curriculum and policy in education using only complexity science is to 
either remain silent about educational responsibility or to project ethico-moral notions onto 
complexity science derived from some other discourse.  
 
In fact, the radical ontology of complexity science troubles certain core assumptions of 
responsibility. Such troubling may be useful, particularly for the field of education where 
responsibility has become a prominent and, some might maintain, problematic discourse. When 
concepts central to responsibility such as agency, morality and intentionality are challenged by 
complexity concepts of flows, co-specification, self-organisation and emergence, the notion of 
‘responsibility’ itself becomes reconfigured. In this respect analyses of ethical action grounded in 
complexity science (e.g. Bai, 2003; Varela, 1999) can be helpful, as are theories about how we 
might understand a ‘call’ to responsibility (Levinas, 1985), the uncertainties and contradictions 
in this call (Derrida, 1995), and participation in responsible action (Biesta, 2006). So while the 
‘ought’ of education cannot be spoken through complexity science, its framework is useful in 
helping to articulate questions and dilemmas of educational responsibility. In this article I 
explore issues of responsibility in complexity science, then consider the possibility of 
educational responsibility animated by complexity theories, drawing from related writings of 
Bai, Biesta, Derrida, Levinas and Varela. 
 
The question of educational responsibility 
 
If the responsibility of educators is to educate, to purposefully bring about learning, then we 
might ask: what understandings of learning and of purpose animate this bringing about? The 
question of educational responsibility has inspired much ethico-moral prescription both for the 
broad domain of pedagogy, practice and policy, and for the domain of educational research. 
McWilliam and Lee (2006) claim that education has been driven by twin fantasies fashioning its 
sense of purpose and therefore responsibility: on the one hand that it can ameliorate social 
disadvantage, and on the other that it can deliver transformative learning outcomes which will 
lead to improvement. Just what should be improved remains highly contested, argue McWilliam 
and Lee, but education historically has assumed a responsibility to socialise individuals to some 
social ends through learning – which in turn is assumed to be good. Whether intended outcomes 
of this learning are related more to building autonomous self-actualised individuals, imagination, 
civil society, a productive economy, or equity and justice, the central point of educational 
responsibility has been principally fixed upon building (and disciplining) particular kinds of 
subjects. Within this primary activity of ‘shaping subjectivities’ (Osberg and Biesta, 2007a), the 
educator’s responsibility is: 
to create learning environments (curricula) in which educational goals (regardless of how 
vaguely defined) can be met. If the outcomes are not met (for whatever reason), the 
educator is considered to have failed in his or her responsibility to educate. (Osberg and 
Biesta, 2007a, p. 3) 
 
Of the problems with current conceptions of educational responsibility, Osberg and Biesta 
(2007a) draw particular attention to the delimiting of learning that occurs when education defines 
itself as teleologically riveted towards particular outcomes. That is, the kinds of meaning that can 
‘emerge’ in a classroom become limited by what is in effect a process of ‘planned enculturation’ 
(p.3). A second problem mentioned briefly by Osberg and Biesta is the adjudication of 
competing cultural visions claiming centrality in educational responsibilities for cultural 
transmission and citizenship development. In particular, in recent years the increasing uptake of 
critical traditions of sociology, curriculum and pedagogy have engendered a strong discourse of 
social responsibility in education. The ascendance of this discourse as a central frame for 
discussions of educational responsibility might be argued to represent a distinct third problem. 
Perspectives within the social responsibility discourses in education are diverse and contested 
(Wildemeersch, et al., 2000). Many are derived from a critical cultural analysis of systems. This 
analysis points to structural inequities and neo-liberal market ideologies that generate 
individualism, hyper-competition, oppression and environmental degradation. The educational 
position is often constituted as one of social justice: another contested concept but often 
associated with generating political awareness, resistance and democratic transformation. For 
example, in the UK Ian Martin, like others trying to revive a radical agenda, calls educators to 
mobilise themselves and others around social transformation: 
The central purpose of critical and creative adult education, as distinct from the current 
hegemony of lifelong learning, should be precisely to challenge this depoliticization of 
politics and to raise such matters as issues for urgent democratic deliberation and debate. 
(Martin, 2003, p. 569) 
 
In this social change tradition of education, social responsibility and active civic participation 
have been widely accepted as self-evident goals achieved through learner empowerment, 
community development, citizen and global education, or participatory literacy. Social 
responsibility is often cast nobly, even messianically, in opposition to educative goals of 
assimilation: accommodating people to a global economy, increasing their skill performance and 
reinforcing dominant discourses of individualism, flexible adaptation, entrepreneurism and self-
interest. Pedagogical concerns of social responsibility are dedicated to raising individuals’ 
awareness and mobilising their participation in issues of social justice, inclusion and equality, 
environmental sustainability, human rights, and so forth. However, in such educational 
discourses including critical, feminist, anti-racist and other emancipatory pedagogies, a danger 
pointed out repeatedly is the presumption of the emancipator pronouncing a vision of democracy 
for others. There is a problematic revolutionary zeal and moral imperative operating that can 
become controlling, and lead to undesirable consequences. 
 
Complexity science, particularly in its current uptake in educational writings (Bai, 2003; Davis 
& Sumara, 2005, 2006; Doll et al., 2005; Haggis, 2007; Laidlaw, 2005; Osberg, 2005) appears to 
offer more generative alternatives for imagining educational responsibility with its emphasis on 
participatory epistemology, mindful engagement, and disruption of certainty. In fact, complexity 
in education may open new ways for rethinking responsibility and interrupting the more 
controlling, moralistic discourses promoting social responsibility in education: ‘We cannot avoid 
responsibility because we cannot avoid responding in some ways to each and every person and 
situation we encounter and thereby affecting the world in some ways’ (Bai, 2003, p. 9). At the 
same time, however, complexity science does not necessarily speak to issues of power relations, 
desire, positional interests, and other dynamics of socio-cultural human systems that figure 
significantly in understanding issues of responsibility and ultimately, of education. Therefore it 
seems fruitful to explore questions of responsibility alongside complexity science in its 
educational uptakes. 
 
There is danger in applying any body of theory to an educational problem, an endeavour that can 
become funnelled into prescribing pedagogical method. Similarly, educative concerns with their 
moral implications and inherent impulse to act for change should be brought to complexity 
science with caution, or important elements of socio-cultural systems and educational practice 
that lie outside the explanatory foci of complexity may disappear from discussion. These caveats 
must be foregrounded in considering complexity science alongside the philosophical problem of 
responsibility as it is taken up in educational practice/debates. In the present discussion, my 
approach is to focus on picking apart issues raised by each domain for the other. That is, I am 
interested in the questions and possibilities that considerations of responsibility bring to 
complexity science in an educational context, as well as questions opened by the reversal. The 
strategy I employ is to read complexity science against responsibility theory, and to read the 
ensuing questions with the educational impulse. From a reading against/reading with position, I 
hope to avoid resolutions, unsettle applications, and to hold open the aporias that will sustain 
perpetual uncertainty and inquiry among these domains. 
 
Responsibility, ethics and education 
 
Before exploring new visions for educational responsibility offered by these themes of 
complexity science, it is important to delineate more precisely what is meant by responsibility 
and what issues it bears. Conceptual discussions of responsibility are wide-ranging, from causal 
(who caused the problem) to consequential responsibility (who takes the blame); and from 
attributed (who is held accountable) to distributed responsibility (how accountability is 
apportioned among agents). In the context of education and in particular, the context of social 
responsibility as an educational purpose driving curriculum and pedagogy, the focus is upon 
moral responsibility that is felt and enacted. The pedagogical questions tend to rally educators’ 
commitment to curricula oriented to particular sites of moral responsibility for social issues 
(solidarity with oppressed peoples, civic participation, democratic action for equity, resistance to 
market globalisation, environmental sustainability, and so forth) and to focus on how best to 
develop this responsibility in students. However in the present discussion I step back from the 
prescriptive to ask critical questions about how moral responsibility can be understood in terms 
of what comprises educational responsibility: that of the educator for learners in particular, and 
community and society in general through pedagogical practice. 
 
Moral responsibility invokes notions of both obligation and moral decision-making. Obligation 
calls forth a sense of duty to care for self and others extending beyond one’s own self-interest, 
and accountability to others for one’s actions. Others in this sense can be interpreted broadly: 
other human beings, other collectives such as community or national interests, authorities, 
tradition, animals or non-sentient beings of the natural universe, concepts or ideals. Moral 
decision-making to acknowledge and act upon one’s responsibilities incites questions about the 
conception of the ‘good’, the attendant criteria or ‘laws’ that should guide individual action, and 
the extent of one’s freedom to choose. Within all of this, as Gibbs (2000) points out, some view a 
distinction between responsibility as felt and responsibility as acted. For example in education, 
there may be emphasis on raising learners’ awareness of and personal commitment to civic 
responsibilities, as well as guiding them to enact their particular responsibilities as students. 
 
In the field of ethics, critical debates have long swirled around the questions: Who is responsible 
to whom, for what, and to what extent? Responsibility has been developed within a tradition of 
rational philosophy as a question primarily of ethical decision-making, invoking issues of 
universal laws and the problem of the contingent particular situation, as well as bonds and 
obligations that inhere in an individual, conceived as autonomous, intentional, and capable of 
acting independently of others. However Levinas (1981) and educational philosophers who have 
taken up his conception of the ethical subject (e.g. van Manen, 2001; Biesta, 2006) have begun 
from a basic critique of the assumptions embedded in this rational tradition. Levinas (1981) 
views the subject as coming into presence through actively ‘being’: which is ‘otherwise than 
being’. First, Levinas counters the view that individuals act and reason as autonomous agents, 
and stresses the intersubjective relationships that enmesh human beings with one another beyond 
their conscious intention or rational application of moral principles. Second, Levinas dismisses 
the act of rational ethical decision-making, arguing that ethical responsibility is moved by and 
enacted within moments of connection, participation with others that calls forth response. 
Derrida (1995), in his meditations on responsibility extending the work of Levinas and 
Kierkegaard, shows the problem of considering just who or what is Other when all are 
enmeshed, and the conflicts between responding to the Other’s call, the community expectations, 
and the other Others excluded by a particular response.  
  
These considerations shift the definition of responsibility from notions of felt duty to the active 
responding to others, broadly conceived, within complex webs of connection. A focus on 
response turns attention away from defining what is the good, and what ethical laws should guide 
action, toward questions about how response is excited, by whom or what, what forms it takes, 
and what are its consequences. Thus, responsibility is not necessarily a modernist or utterly 
rational construct, but can be a phenomenal and relational dynamic whose logic is not 
necessarily irreconcilable with complexity science.  
 
Complexity science and education 
 
To be clear about the understandings informing this discussion I have selected themes that, 
for me, distinguish a complexity perspective: emergence, flows and relations, uncertainty, self-
organisation, and interconnected diversity. It is not my intent here to debate details of complexity 
theor(ies), nor to defend complexity science’s explanation of reality, cognition, knowledge and 
subjectivity. Nor do I attempt to present a comprehensive or monolithic view of complexity 
science, which is by now represented with wide-ranging degrees of nuance and rigor in the social 
sciences as a heterogeneous family of theories. Instead I draw on those themes that seem to have 
most frequent uptake among educational writers such as Davis and Sumara (2006), Davis, 
Sumara and Luce-Kepler (2000), Haggis (2007), Karpiak (2000), Laidlaw (2005), and Osberg 
(2005), who themselves draw upon complexity theories of, among others, Capra (1996), 
Prigogine (1997), and Waldrop (1992). (For a useful explanation of further concepts in 
complexity science, consult the Complexity and Education glossary at the University of Alberta: 
http://www.complexityandeducation.ualberta.ca/glossary.htm) 
 
The key theme is emergence, the understanding that in (complex adaptive) systems, phenomena, 
events and actors are mutually dependent, mutually constitutive, and actually emerge together in 
dynamic structures. That is, the nature of the system as well its elements and their relationships – 
both human and non-human - emerge through the continuous rich and recursive interactions 
among these elements. No clear lines of causation can be traced from these interactions to their 
outcomes, because at any given time among all these interconnections possibilities are contained 
in the system that are not visible or realised. This means, among other things, that humans are 
fully nested within and interconnected with many elements of the systems comprising them and 
in which they participate. They are not considered to be autonomous, sovereign agents to whom 
responsibility can be attributed or extracted. The following paragraphs elaborate further 
dynamics of emergence from a complexity science perspective. 
 
One characteristic of the ongoing interactions in complexity is the process of ‘structural 
coupling’ (Maturana and Varela, 1987). That is, when two actors or systems coincide, the 
‘perturbations’ of one excites responses and changes in the structural dynamics of the other, 
which couple with and alter the elements engaging with it in a new unity. An educational project, 
for example, is a collective activity in which interaction both enfolds and renders visible the 
participants, the objects mediating their actions and dialogue, the problem space that they define 
together, and the emerging plan or solution they devise. As each person contributes and responds 
within the activity, she changes the interactions and the emerging object of focus; other 
participants are changed, the relational space among them all changes, and the looping-back 
changes the contributor’s actions and subject position. This is ‘mutual specification’ (Varela, 
Thompson, and Rosch, 1991), the fundamental dynamic of systems constantly engaging in joint 
action and interaction. The resultant coupling changes or ‘co-specifies’ each creating a new 
transcendent unity of action and identities that could not have been achieved independently by 
participants. These emergences are recursive, continuing to elaborate what is present and what is 
possible in the system. Out of these continuous and non-linear interactions emerge dynamic 
structures that exceed their parts. Osberg and Biesta (2007b) call this ‘strong emergence’: 
conditions where what emerges is more than the sum of its parts, and therefore not predictable 
from the ‘ground’ it emerges from. Davis and Sumara (2005) offer detailed explanations of the 
science implicated in strong emergence, which have been illuminated by analytic tools such as 
fractal geometry. 
fractals are generated through recursive processes—in contrast to Euclidean forms, which 
are built up through linear sequences of operations. At each stage in a recursive 
processes, the starting point is the output of the preceding iteration, and the output is the 
starting point of the subsequent iteration. Every stage, that is, is an elaboration, and such 
elaborations can quickly give rise to unexpected forms and surprising complexity. The 
sorts of recursive functions that are used to generate fractals are also non-compressible. 
There are no shortcuts to their final products. A person interested in the eventual product 
of a fractal-generating function must allow it to unfold. (Davis & Sumara, 2005, p. 309) 
 
Further, what emerges – whether knowledge, identities, practices or symbols – is specific to the 
system in which it emerged, and therefore cannot exist as an object that can move to another 
system. In the educational uptake of complexity science, the notion of flows and relations among 
things, rather than the things themselves, are emphasised (e.g. see Davis 2004; Davis & Sumara 
2006; Karpiak 2000; Laidlaw 2005). The focus is not upon isolated actors and objects 
foregrounded against some contextual backdrop, but on the dynamic, nonlinear actions and 
connections flowing between all these parts. That is, complexity science interrupts the natural 
tendency to seek clear boundaries between figures and grounds, and focuses on the relationships 
binding humans and non-humans (e.g., desks, cell phones, bacteria, buildings, language, smells, 
memories) together in multiple fluctuations in complex systems. Thus, argue complexity 
theorists, the boundaries between self and non-self (nature as well as society) are actually more 
permeable and the flow between them more continuous than we might be prepared to accept.  
 
 Related to this emergence of novel forms through these non-linear dynamics of 
interaction, is the complex system’s continuous state of uncertainty and surprise, a condition that 
Prigogine (1997) famously described as ‘far from equilibrium’. What is happening within and 
among systems is affected by many active micro-interactions and improvisations that cannot be 
tracked, whose outcomes are affecting one another to form continually emerging phenomena. 
Uncertainty is a central structural principle within these dynamic processes. Actions, choices and 
meanings that will emerge are unpredictable. In other words so many things are going on all at 
once and so many new possibilities emerging that there can be no reduction of the system’s 
patterns to causes and effects. More to the point, among the possibilities emerging at any given 
time in the system, it is impossible to predict which will most influence what will happen next. 
This is partly because the principles influencing the system’s choices for action and knowledge 
are not present in the system’s present patterns or its parts – they emerge too, in the dynamic 
processes of emergence. Therefore, the future of the system can be nowhere evident in the 
patterns of the present system. This fundamental property of uncertainty naturally poses 
challenges for educational planning, governance, application of routines or laws including ethical 
laws, and issues of accountability and responsibility. 
 
One consequence of this disequilibrium is continuous adaptive change. A complex system is 
self-modifying - sensitive and responding to changes within it and around it - in constant 
dialogue with its environment. Its many components are always alive, always interacting 
creatively with parts directly around them. These interactions form patterns all by themselves – 
they do not organise according to some sort of externally imposed blueprint – so complexity 
theorists describe such systems as self-organising. That is, through the ongoing processes of 
recursively elaborative adaptation, the system can maintain its form without some externally-
imposed discipline or organising device, such as lesson plans, teachers, and class schedules. 
What Davis (2004) calls a ‘transcendent collectivity’ (p. 151) with an identifiable unity and 
coherence emerges through the bottom-up interactions of multiple agents. New novel forms of 
order are continually emerging, but the system usually will continue to maintain its identity 
except in the condition of severe perturbation.  
 
The key to a healthy system – able to emerge into a resilient unity and adapt creatively to 
changing conditions -- is interconnected diversity among its parts. A human body, for example, 
relies on highly specialised subsystems that not only each respond to different circumstances and 
different needs, but also have learned to co-habitate and communicate with one another. Other 
dynamics required in self-organisation are, according to Davis (2004), redundancy or sufficient 
overlap among the agents (such as shared texts, language, interests) to enable the interactions 
that will give rise to the system, a means by which agents can affect one another such as 
proximity, and a decentralised, distributed form of organisation. When these elements are 
present, a system can emerge with a distinct integrity without top-down control, even as it is 
continually interacting with the systems surrounding it and embedded within it. As Hesoon Bai 
(2001) writes, ‘Changes are the result of our interpenetrating the world’ (p. 26), more than of our 
conscious intentional action to do something. 
 
Overall, in complexity science knowledge and action are understood as continuous invention and 
exploration, produced through relations among consciousness, identity, action and interaction, 
objects and structural dynamics. New possibilities for action are constantly emerging among 
these interactions of complex systems, and cognition occurs in the possibility for unpredictable 
shared action. Knowledge and therefore responsibility cannot be contained in any one element or 
dimension of a system, for knowledge is constantly emerging and spilling into other systems. No 
actor has an essential self or knowledge outside these relationships: nothing is given in the order 
of things, but performs itself into existence. In educational applications of complexity science, 
attention is drawn to the relationships among learners and the environment. Learning is defined 
as expanded possibilities for action, or becoming ‘capable of more sophisticated, more flexible, 
more creative action’ (Davis, Sumara, & Luce-Kepler, 2000). 
  
These principles of emergence and interpenetration of people and objects, the flows and relations 
connecting them, the uncertainty arising from their many interactions and the self-organisation 
emerging from the system’s interconnected diversity and creative adaptations are helping to 
challenge conceptual subject/object splits. Complexity science refuses the notion that universal 
laws can be applied to systems of activity, that autonomous individuals are separated from 
Others, that they act according to independent choices and rational intentions, and that therefore 
they bear personal moral responsibilities that govern their choices for action. These notions point 
towards a complexified view of responsibility as woven into fully embodied nets of ongoing 
action, invention, social relations and history in complex adaptive systems. 
 
The problem of responsibility in complexity science 
 
Nonetheless, it becomes immediately apparent that certain dilemmas are generated when reading 
responsibility against complexity science, at least as represented by the themes selected for 
discussion here, and when reading both with educational considerations.  
 
What forms and meanings has responsibility in an emergent universe? 
 
First, a central problem is the application of complexity science, designed to explain phenomena 
and shifting patterns in the natural world, to socio-cultural systems. This critique is by now 
rather commonplace so a brief summary may be satisfactory. While complexity science has 
focused on physical movements and links among objects and actors, human systems are very 
much determined by interpretive movements among perceptions, symbols, identities, and 
meanings. Therefore relations among humans cannot be explained solely in terms of physical 
motion and change because they entail emotion, desire, power, and ethics. Applications of 
complexity science to social questions have been engendered through a metaphor of complexity, 
argue critics such as Houchin and McLean (2005). That is, the images of emergence, self-
organisation, uncertainty, flows and so forth can and have been treated as representations of 
desirable patterns, then projected interpretively onto realist social systems to produce notions of 
positive human interconnections, inventive adaptation and continuous learning. While such 
metaphors hold a certain romantic appeal they in fact correspond only faintly to either their 
scientific progenitors or to the forces that actually influence social systems. However, Osberg 
and Biesta (2007a) counter that a poststructural or philosophical approach to complexity – in 
contrast to the metaphorical appropriation of complexity notions – can open what they consider 
to be a politically conscious explanation of human systems and relations. In such an 
approach to complexity, the focus is not upon patterns of actors and action but upon enacted 
knowledge which is ‘neither a representation of something more ‘real’ than itself, nor an ‘object’ 
that can be transferred from one place to the next … Knowledge is understood, rather, to 
‘emerge’ as we participate in the world’ (p.2). 
 
Even if we accept that human social systems can be adequately addressed using a philosophical 
approach to complexity, are notions of responsibility, understood as either response or 
obligation, at all compatible with a complexity universe of flows and emergence? That is, while 
complex systems are identifiable and bounded, they are continually dynamic, changing and 
adapting in novel unpredictable patterns through myriad interplays within and among various 
systems occurring in an environment. Bai (2003) asks, what does it mean to be a human being, a 
person, in a relational universe? How does one being relate to another, and what is it for 
relational beings to have responsibility towards each other? Since educational processes 
fundamentally shape particular conceptions of humanity and social behaviors among learners 
(and teachers), these are central questions. Complexity itself neither implies nor encourages any 
‘oughts’ for behavior among its elements, and educators are left to map their own answers to the 
central question: How should we act in a relational universe? Clark (2003) argues that we need 
an ethics to negotiate and regulate conditions of uncertainty. This may be particularly pressing 
when we believe all of our actions are so interconnected as to pose profound implications for the 
system’s emergence. For educators, who are also pressed in the thick of emergence to form 
judgments that affect students immediately and the community eventually, the question of 
responsibility is about how to approach such judgments when one cannot know what shapes are 
emerging, let alone assess them as desirable or undesirable. 
 
The notion of emergence also invites considerations about what sorts of responsibility might 
arise out of entanglement in volatile processes, and what forms of novelty and surprise might 
arise out of response and responsibility in emergent processes. If actors simply respond 
spontaneously, care for the vulnerable may or may not emerge: indeed, social history has proven 
quite the opposite. And accountability, which rests on notions of personal and collective 
responsibility, remains an important if currently over-rationalised dynamic in educational 
purpose and delivery. What are the implications of responsibility when causes cannot be 
disentangled from effects? Finally, emergence requires conceptualisation of responsibility in an 
inter-objective universe, where the flows connect humans and non-humans. How do we 
understand responsibility to and among objects (and tools and discourses), and from objects to 
humans? 
 
How can alterity and care for others be understood? 
 
Second, if there is no autonomous, determinate individual separate from interactions and 
relations embedding and co-specifying all actors within the webs of a complex system, who 
takes responsibility for whom? Bai (2003) is one of the few who have undertaken close 
examination of ethics in complexity science. She argues that when we view the other as an 
‘inter-penetrating matrix of relationships ... an inter-being with the self’ (p. 9), we think not in 
terms of controlling the other but as establishing a union from which can emerge a desired 
pattern of relation for both parties. These relations are dynamic, non-linear, and hence non-
deterministic. In a conception very similar to Varela’s, Bai describes being as an ‘inter-
penetration’ of elements and forces that cannot be considered as separate or separable (Bai, 2003, 
p. 10). This conception implies that there is no distinct other to which a subject responds, and 
therefore no singular subject that discerns distinction and need, and formulates a response. 
 
Yet emergence and self-organisation depend upon diversity and interaction among diverse parts. 
In educational contexts, as Davis and Sumara (2005) argue, diversity is critical to ensure 
uncertainty and continual improvisation in the group, from which emergence and resilience are 
generated. For diversity and difference to exist, there must be distinction among elements: there 
must be alterity. And where there is alterity there must be singularity. But equitable positionings, 
or symmetry, among singularities is hardly reasonable to assume; indeed, social science has 
established the ubiquity of asymmetry in social systems. Recognition of these differences both 
cultural and individual, as Taylor (1994) argued from a political perspective, is absolutely critical 
as the beginning of mutual interdependence. Even when subjects are considered to be partially 
singular but connected in relationship, we are led to ask what compels these relations, these 
inter-connections, beyond chance encounters? Psychoanalytic theorists show how humans in 
educational pursuits of knowledge are influenced by desire, manifested as attraction and 
repulsion (Britzman, 1998). Social theorists show the influences of dominant cultural discourses, 
positional interests, economic and social asymmetries that govern behaviors and connections 
within social systems. Arguably, complexity science has failed to account for these influences. 
Asymmetry begs the ethico-political question of responsibility among parts, which cannot be 
answered easily when the default position is to an ontology of inter-penetration. 
 
What is desirable and what desires are possible in self-organisation? 
 
Education begs the question of what constitutes a desirable future, or even a desirable or healthy 
system. Complexity science, however, does not indicate what is desirable beyond the survival of 
the system in some form  – either to ensure maximum benefit for greatest number, to honour 
humanity, or to adhere a priori to rational ethical laws or virtues. Complex adaptive systems in 
the natural world do not necessarily care for their vulnerable parts, nor do they seek equity 
among parts, or arbitrate asymmetries. Many systems left to self-organise emerge as destructive, 
dehumanising, even hierarchical systems which shut down rather than promote creativity. 
Indeed, the exercise of human desires, positional interests and power relations within any social 
systems often produce order and control rather than emergence The few empirical studies 
available of attempts to induce complexity among social organisations report discouraging 
outcomes. Houchin and Maclean (2005) for example, in a longitudinal study of four 
organisations, showed that using complexity concepts of decentralised self-organisation and 
promoting emergence through diversity, feedback and interaction actually induced anxiety that 
created fragmentation and reinforced power differentials. They concluded that self-organisation 
can actually favour the powerful, marginalise or destroy the weak, and induce actions that cause 
destruction or degradation of some elements. One response to this could be that complexity was 
not actually created in these cases, but such an assessment implies that ‘true’ complex adaptive 
systems are manifestations of pre-existing ideal forms, which contradicts the central tenets of 
self-organisation and diversity. But the other issue of self-organisation and creative adaptation, 
as Blanchot (1995, p. 2, 48) points out, is that what may be for some an act of creation, an 
irruption of novelty, is for others a `disaster’ – loss, disorientation, a radical unworlding. In fact, 
destruction and destabilisation are necessary in continuous organising processes of systems 
operating far from equilibrium. This disequilibrium promotes and is promoted through 
experimentation and play, but also through rupturings, disasters, and deaths. What position can 
responsibility take in such conditions? How can an educator act, and towards what educational 
purposes? 
 
Re-thinking educational responsibility in complexified education 
 
Writers who have applied ideas from complexity to education in school as well as work 
environments tend to characterise the dynamic non-linear interactions as benign encounters of 
co-specification out of which new creative possibilities emerge. Kauffman (1995, p. 30) 
describes the world of complexity as one of ‘enchantment’ marked by `gentle reverence for ever-
changing and unpredictable places in the sun we craft ever anew for one another’. Bai (2003) 
writes of universal beneficence and generosity that inheres in the relational world of non-linear 
causality. Davis (2004) claims that complexity discourses ‘advocate an attitude of mindful 
participation in the unfolding of personal and collective identities, culture, intercultural space, 
and the biosphere’ (p. 176). Davis and Sumara (2005) encourage teachers to induce emergence in 
classrooms by creating conditions that have been associated with complex adaptive systems: 
diversity, interaction, redundancy, decentralisation, and feedback. In this invocation educators 
insert themselves as responsible agents into a system, manufacturing conditions to produce 
effects based on a view of a desirable future – continuous adaptation, creative improvisation, 
collective emergence of knowledge and action, and so forth.  
  
But when such a view is constructed entirely within complexity science, its proponents may be 
tilting towards a certain totalisation in the same way that those arguing for social justice impose a 
view of structural oppression and desire for social responsibility on education. In both cases as 
for us all, a moral imperative is at work, reminding us to question the self-reflexive awareness of 
the theorists’ own positional interests. What explicitly is the view of educational responsibility, 
and how can this view be justified within its own theoretical parameters? When educators take 
up a responsibility to achieve an ideal social future through educational practice, they are not 
only presuming to impose a particular moral imagination on the emergence of things but also, 
recalling McWilliam and Lee (2006), assuming that learning processes can and should serve as a 
channel to realising these imagined futures. These assumptions underpin a sort of pedagogical 
audacity (Fenwick, 2005) upheld through appeals for educational purposes rooted in some notion 
of a social good. Whether driven by messianic ideologies of equity and social justice or notions 
of holism and ‘mindful participation’, whether justifiable or not in terms of prevailing 
community desires and priorities, the question returns to how learning and educational processes 
are understood in such purposes. As Osberg and Biesta (2007a) point out, when education is 
conceived as a process of shaping subjectivities – socialising particular minds, bodies and 
knowledge in a process of ‘planned enculturation’  – the possibilities of learning are truncated. 
The possibilities of what a human being can become and what knowledge and activity might 
emerge through educational processes are reduced and contained in pre-determined and 
ultimately reproductive conceptions. 
  
Yet to eschew the insertion of responsibility in educational processes for fear of controlling or 
colonising others is, Biesta (2006) argues, to be irresponsible. The educator must do something 
to fulfil responsibility as educator, must bring about something, must act purposefully. So, given 
these issues, what can educational responsibility mean in a ‘complexified’ educational vision? 
 
Immediacy - focus on the imminent 
 
One place to start is with a little book entitled Ethical Know-How by Francisco Varela (1999). 
While Varela is speaking from a theory he and colleagues called enactivism, his tenets of 
emergence, inter-connectedness through co-specification, and self-organisation are closely 
aligned with the themes of complexity science adopted for this discussion. His work is frequently 
referenced by educational writings that incorporate complexity science (e.g. Davis, Sumara and 
Luce-Kepler, 2000). Varela’s arguments are not unproblematic: indeed, in trying to fashion a 
complexity-rooted explanation of ethics, he appears to end up drawing from Buddhist ideas that 
then are imposed upon complexity science as though they have emanated naturally from its own 
precepts. 
 
Varela argues that ethical knowhow is enacted in spontaneous everyday responses – ‘immediate 
coping’ rather than through acquiring and applying ethical rules. He claims that despite our 
illusions of reasoned choice and intentional action, ‘we always operate in immediacy in the 
world’ without deliberate pre-reflection that effectively governs our behavior. Therefore ethical 
learning, for Varela, is about discovering how one acts through immersed with others in the 
everyday: that is, reflecting on one’s ways of participating with others and the consequences of 
these encounters. He eschews the disciplining of behavior towards any pre-determined good, 
arguing instead for removing barriers to ‘natural ethical wisdom’ innate in beings, a wisdom that 
Varela maintains prompts ‘spontaneous compassion’. 
 
It is here that Varela indicates what responsibility might mean in a relational, emergent universe. 
His notion of response focuses upon local encounters, in spatial terms, and his temporal focus is 
upon the immediate – the spontaneity of connections and immersions unfolding as they are 
enacted. Varela’s emphasis is on the quality of the connection itself, on what is created in-
between and with-in beings in the moments of encounter and interaction.  
 
That Varela is concerned with compassion in these encounters is, however, problematic. 
Compassion – with passion, especially suffering with – invokes emotions of ardency, abandon 
and desire as well as empathetic caring, even solidarity with the other. However, Varela does not 
clarify why this quality emerges or is desirable, nor what prompts compassion among beings – or 
even the relation of compassionate response: whether mutual or directed towards the one in need, 
conditional or unconditional. A problematic equivalency among beings appears to be assumed, 
as though positionality is not at issue. A further problem is Varela’s conception of spontaneous 
response. While this may describe an individual’s experience of responding or even a casual 
viewer’s perception of responsiveness, it does not address the complex relations at play. What 
causes the response to this one and not that one? Why a response in this way and not some 
alternative? The source for Varela’s focus on compassion is also ambiguous. It derives not from 
complexity science’s explanations of behaviors across systems. Indeed as Varela develops the 
idea with reference to ‘a transcendance of ego’ and ‘freedom from the ‘grasping’ desiring I’, he 
seems to be applying moral guidance from some doctrine external to complexity science, in ways 
that take us back to teaching particular forms of response approved by some pre-determined 
universal principle of the good. 
 
However Varela’s encouragement to attend not to ethical laws but to the responses and 
connections that emerge in immediate local encounters among beings is helpful, and reminiscent 
of Bauman’s (1993) writings about ethics in a postmodern age. Bauman’s analysis can be 
considered relevant given that complexity science in education has been described as a 
‘postmodern’ approach (Clark, 2001; Davis and Sumara, 2006). Ethical being, writes Bauman, 
embraces uncertainty, lets go of rational intention, and engages the micro-interactions. Reason 
will deprive the self ‘of what makes the self moral . . . That non-calculable urge to stretch 
towards the other, to caress, to be for, to live for, happen what may’ (p.247). 
 
Response – emerging in the ‘yes’ to the other  
 
This urge toward the other recalls the conception of the ethical subject emerging in encounters 
with the other proposed by Levinas. For Levinas (1985), responsibility is enacted as a response 
to the ‘call’ of the other. The other is not an object to be possessed, nor an obligation dictated by 
ethical rules, but a subject to whom the I is personally and unconditionally responsible. The other 
precedes the subject, is not constructed or ‘recognised’ as part of one’s conscious ethical 
obligations. The call is felt as a non-conscious appeal, face to face. Levinas describes this appeal 
as being held ‘hostage’ by the other, in subjection. Further, the call is for me, and no other. In 
this intersubjective ethics, the response is of caring or justice to a call of need from one who is 
vulnerable, suffering, or otherwise positioned asymmetrically to the one called. Such response is 
not a rational decision motivated by duty but an immediate bond to the other. In this response the 
subject emerges: 
This charge is a supreme dignity of the unique. I am I in the sole measure that I am 
responsible, a non-interchangeable I. I can substitute myself for everyone, but no one can 
substitute himself for me. (Levinas, 1989, p. 101) 
 
Responsibility, then, inheres in the actual relation between human beings. The I apprehends the 
call of the other and responds: not by appropriating the other, manufacturing, developing, 
rehabilitating, socialising, or any of the other positions commonly adapted in pedagogical 
relations – but responding. This position is echoed in Bai’s (2003) conception of responsibility in 
the relational universe, where she explains that a subject does not have relationships, as though it 
existed as an unchanging entity, possessing connections, whose interaction with the world results 
in external and circumstantial changes. Instead,  ‘We are our relationships. We are nothing other 
than our relationships—with each other, with the world’ (p. 23, italics added).  
 
But Levinas avoids dissolving the subject into a universalised matrix of inter-being: ‘The 
strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and my possessions, is 
precisely accomplished as a calling into question of my spontaneity as ethics’ (Levinas, 1969, p. 
33). The other remains unknowable, outside the totality we may wish to incorporate it into: our 
relation with the other is a ‘relation without relation’ (ibid., p. 79). Thus, as Biesta (2006) 
explains, in Levinas’ conception of relationship he shows the singularity of the subject as 
enmeshed and interdependent while unique and asymmetrical: the unique subject is born in an 
ethical relationship, not ascribed to an essence; and enacted through participation in the 
responsibility of that relationship, not through conscious exercise of ethical principles: 
What constitutes me as this unique individual, as this singular being, is the point in time 
(which according to Levinas is actually the very beginning of temporality) at which I no 
longer deny the undeniable responsibility that is waiting for me. It is the point in time 
when I say ‘yes’ to the other, keeping in mind that this ‘yes’ is always already a response 
to a ‘question’ and not an act of recognition that would only bring the Other into 
existence. The Other exists before me. (Biesta, 2006, p. 86) 
 
According to this view of responsibility, my response to the other, turning to face the call and to 
say ‘yes’, is an awakening – both to the uniqueness of me, and to the relation and subjection to 
the other in which I am already, and have always been, constituted. Therefore theoretically we 
have a way to understand both alterity and the motive to connect across asymmetry within the 
flows, emergence, uncertainty and relational self-organisation of complexity science. 
 
Openness - seeking new connections 
 
Responding to ‘calls’ of others requires a discernment of these calls to begin with. Karpiak 
(2000), another educator drawing upon complexity science, writes at length about attunement: 
the capacity to actively sense other possibilities. This has some resonance with Levinas’ 
emphasis upon a general orientation to connection with the other. Bai (2001) also describes this 
orientation, which for her comes through an awareness and desire for interconnectedness. Such 
attunement or orientation to connection presumes an openness. This presumption poses questions 
about when and to what are elements disposed to open themselves to connection with other 
elements. 
 
The dynamic of opening is also treated by Deleuze and Guattari (1987). Their emphases on 
processes, flows across bodies, and complex becomings are consistent with principles of 
complexity science. Unlike Levinasian ethics modelled on subject-to-subject human 
relationships, Deleuze and Guattari do not foreground the human, phenomenological subject. In 
their discussion of processes of becoming, they portray a driving force of creativity manifesting 
in the desire to seek out new connections. In the resulting excess of energy the self is always 
open to reconfiguration but also interlinked with the environment in ongoing exchange. The ideal 
nomad is not characterised by continuous movement but by receptivity and responsive to the 
dynamics flowing around and through (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 380-81). This will to 
encounter and connect is itself ethical: a body opening to others. Such opening, such 
vulnerability, is a risk. There is always uncertainty as to the resulting possibility or connection 
bringing harm or creative transformation. But then all generative forces are violent, destroying 
current existence. Drawing from these ideas, Clark (2003) concludes that to act ethically is to 
remain attuned, receptive and responsive, working with the forces at hand: the dynamics of the 
system in which one is implicated. The attunement or opening is not only an acceptance of risk, 
but a generous orientation:  Deleuze and Guattari (1987, p. 277) write that the relations of 
generosity and generativity are at the heart of becoming and the advent of the ethical. In a 
resonant direction, Bai (2003, p. 10) emphasises what she calls ‘the generosity principle’ that she 
claims animates ethical relations in complexity. This generosity is, suggests Bai, an outpouring, 
an excess of action, almost a compensation for an under-determinate, non-linear world where 
one can never know how one’s actions have affected/are affecting the unfolding patterns. 
 
Leaping into uncertainty – responsibility without knowledge 
 
While these reflections on a generous orientation and openness to connection help address the 
question of how we become sufficiently aware to respond to others’ call, they still leave open the 
question of who we are drawn to, why, and with what consequences in a complex universe of 
asymmetrical beings. One source of assistance here may be Derrida (1995), whose later writings 
on ethics expanded and reconfigured Levinas’ conception of the compelling call to respond to an 
other unconditionally. Derrida, like Varela, portrays responsibility not as an abstract notion but 
as an intimate and everyday experience: 
Always there is implied involvement in action, doing, a praxis, a decision that exceeds 
simple conscience or simple theoretical understanding. It is also true that the same 
concept requires a decision or responsible action to answer for itself consciously, that is, 
with a knowledge of a thematics of what is done, of what action signifies, its causes its 
ends, etc. (Derrida, 1995, p. 25) 
In particular, Derrida emphasises that any action of responsibility requires a ‘leap into 
uncertainty’, beyond what can be known, beyond the existing laws and norms of responsible 
behaviour. One main reason for this uncertainty is that one’s action is always, in a sense, 
damaging. This is because of all the other Others that are and must be excluded in responding to 
the call of a particular Other. The example Derrida dwells upon is drawn from Levinas’ own 
explanations: the near-sacrifice of Isaac by his father Abraham following direction from God. In 
responding to this call of the Father, Abraham must betray both obligatory paternal bonds and 
community standards for which such infanticide is unthinkable. As Derrida concludes:’I cannot 
respond to the call, the request, the obligation, or even the love of another, without sacrificing the 
other other, the other others’ (Derrida, 1995, p 68). The unrealised possibilities in the calls of 
these other others, and our irresponsibility in turning from them, haunt our every decision and 
action. 
 
This is why, according to Derrida, our enactments of responsibility must unfold in secrecy, and 
involve sacrifice. We always sacrifice others to respond to the immediate, and our action of 
response is far too complex to withstand the judgment of community standards and universal 
laws, which are always more simplistic than everyday dilemmas. In fact, Derrida cautions that 
one never ‘act in good conscience’, following universal principles, because to do so is 
irresponsible: one simply resorts to generality rather than participating fully in the conflicting 
calls of the immediate. So, true responsibility consists in oscillating between the demands of that 
which is wholly other and the more general demands of a community. Responsibility is enduring 
this trial of the undecidable decision, this interminable experience, where attending to the call of 
a particular other will inevitably demand an estrangement from the ‘other others’ and their 
communal needs, and where closure to the problem is never reached. Whatever decision one may 
take, according to Derrida, it can never be wholly justified. As Edgoose (1997) points out, the 
aporia of undecidability alone would result in paralysis and procrastination:  
But the aporia of urgency forces this into an instant of hesitation. Between the universal 
and the particular, as Kierkegaard well knew, one must leap. (p. 276). 
 
And thus this decision is a leap into uncertainty. To act otherwise, to resort to ethical laws or 
community directives, dissolves one’s singularity, one’s coming into presence - in presence of 
this singular other that is calling one forth. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this preliminary exploration of responsibility read both with and against themes from 
complexity science in educational contexts, I have tried to highlight some useful intersections. It 
appears that reflections on responsibility by Levinas and Derrida are resonant with complexity 
science in emphasising the importance of relations among beings, and of ‘becomings’ as 
generated within these relations, not pre-existing them. What responsibility invokes are questions 
about just how, when and what beings relate to others in different circumstances. These 
questions help bring into play the ethico-political dimension that is inherently absent in 
complexity science, which is one reason why complexity precepts have sometimes proved 
difficult to apply to social systems fraught with power relations, desire, positional interests, and 
economic and social assymetries. Considerations of responsibility also illuminate certain silences 
in complexity science, as it is currently being applied in educational writings, around issues of 
alterity and difference, care for (vulnerable) others, what constitutes a desirable future, and how 
one should act in a relational universe – all issues that educators must deal with. 
 
But I have also explored some helpful alternatives offered by complexity themes to certain 
notions of social responsibility that have become rather uncritically embraced in educational 
theory and practice, particularly in contemporary adult education. Ideas of consciousness-raising, 
resistance and emancipation – indeed, any moral imperatives driving an educational vision 
imposed upon others – can be deeply problematic. Complexity challenges these notions to 
consider webs of relations, interconnectivity, and emergent designs and strategies. To expand 
upon these themes, drawing from philosophical writings on responsibility, we are led to consider 
the nature of response to one another among beings, and the consequences of this response. From 
these writings I have suggested alternative approaches to educational responsibility that remain 
consistent with complexity themes but that incorporate considerations of power, positionality, 
language and desire that are key dynamics in human systems. These approaches include focusing 
on the immediate and imminent, opening to the possibility of connections, attuning to the other’s 
call and responding to it, and leaping into uncertainty by accepting the turmoil of sacrifice and 
secrets attending one’s participation in response.  
 
But to return to the central problem, how does one live and act ‘responsibly’ in educational 
practice according to these characteristics or any others while unsettling the very notion of 
responsibility? Biesta (2006) advises that educators end up living the double: the responsibility 
of the undoing while doing. This follows Derrida (2005), who writes of being committed to both 
design and its transgression. The determined pedagogical impulse to control, to change, to 
rehabilitate, needs to be resisted if new openings and alternatives can flourish. The caring 
pedagogical relation based on a gaze constructing deficit and improvement can be re-situated to a 
gaze of response: face-to-face, unconditional. The moral pedagogical mantra of social 
responsibility can be productively redirected through ontologies of a relational universe where 
unique subjects are understood to emerge through non-linear flows of responsible relations. 
Educators might think of doing less rather than more: focus on the immediate, open to 
possibility, leap into uncertainty, care without knowledge. Biesta (2006) argues that 
responsibility of the educator: 
lies precisely in a concern for the paradoxical – or deconstructive – combination 
of education and its undoing. … [W]hat disrupts the smooth operation of the 
rational community is not necessarily a disturbance of the educational process, but 
might well be the very point at which students begin to find their own, unique, 
responsive and responsible voice. This also shows that the responsibility of the 
educator, the educational responsibility, is a responsibility for something that 
cannot be known in advance – it is a responsibility without knowledge of what 
one is responsible for. (p. 68) 
 
Ultimately, what responsibility means for education, from a complexity perspective, is actively 
living in the aporia – between collective law, the unconditional call of an other, the call of other 
others – with no certainty about what might emerge or what is right. But still, we can and must 
act within this undecidability. It may be in our attunement to the imminent, our openness to 
connective possibilities, and our active response to calls of these possibilities, despite their risk, 
that we and others may emerge in educational relationships.  
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